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Common Law Liability of Accountants




In 1931, the New York Court of Appeals held in Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche (Nevin & Co.)' that an accountant generally is not
liable for pecuniary loss suffered by a third party who relies on an
audit performed pursuant to a contract between the accountant and
his or her client. The third party could recover only if he or she was
the primary beneficiary of the contract 2 or there was fraud on the
part of the accountant.8 This holding accorded with the privity of
contract doctrine established in the early common law.4
Over fifty years later, most jurisdictions still retain some aspect
of Ultramares.5 There have been constant assaults on the citadel of
privity, however, and some commentators and courts have urged its
excision from the area of accountants' third party liability.'
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Norfolk State University. LL.B., University of
Ghana (1976); LL.M., University of London (1977); Ph.D., University of London (1981);
LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center (1985). Member of New York Bar (1986).
1. 225 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
2. Id. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
3. Id. at 189, 174 N.E.at 448.
4. The doctrine was formulated in the English case of Winterbottom v. Wright, 152
Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). There, a passenger was denied recovery for his injuries from the de-
fendant, who had negligently failed to maintain the coach, on the ground of the absence of
privity. Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889) later held that a third party could not recover
for pecuniary loss in an action for deceit in the absence of willful or reckless misrepresenta-
tions. Since 1981, however, English courts have held accountants liable to reasonably foresee-
able third parties who detrimentally rely on negligently audited financial statements. See
J.E.B. Fasteners v. Monks, Bloom & Co., 3 All. E. R. 289 (1981).
5. See Comment, The Citadel Falls? Liability for Accountants in Negligence to Third
Parties Absent Privity: Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 59 ST. JOHiN's L.
REV. 348, 359 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, The Citadel Falls?] (authored by James B.
Blanley). At least three states (New Jersey, Wisconsin, and California) follow a reasonable
foreseeability standard. As of 1984, at least eight states had adopted the specifically foresee-
able standard of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977). See Comment, Adjusting
Accountants' Liability for Negligence: Recovery for Reasonably Foreseeable Users of Finan-
cial Statements, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 301, 308 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Adjusting Ac-
countants' Liability] (authored by Brian J. Frank).
6. See, e.g., Weiner, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for
Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233, 260 (1983); Comment, The Citadel
Falls?, supra note 5, at 359-62; Note, Negligent Misrepresentation and the Certified Public
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This Article discusses recent developments respecting the con-
tinued assault on the privity doctrine, considering whether its death
knell may have sounded. The Article begins with a discussion of UI-
tramares and an examination of the different erosions of the privity
doctrine. Although the Article does not attempt a detailed examina-
tion 'of statutory incisions into the doctrine, the effect of securities
laws on litigation in this area will be noted. The Article concludes
with a consideration of which position regarding accountants' liabil-
ity to non-privy parties is most desirable from a public policy
perspective.
II. Ultramares and the Privity Doctrine
A. The Case
In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche (Nevin & Co.),7 the defendant
accountants prepared an audit of Fred Stern & Co. The accountants
negligently overvalued the assets of the company.s The defendants
knew that their client would solicit credit on the basis of the finan-
cial report and, in fact, they furnished the client with thirty-two cer-
tified copies of its report for distribution.9 Ultramares loaned money
to Fred Stern & Co. in reliance on the financial report and subse-
quently lost its investment when the debtor declared bankruptcy."0
The court denied recovery on a negligence theory but held that re-
covery might be possible on a fraud theory."
In addressing the negligence theory, Judge Cardozo held that
the accountants owed no duty to Ultramares, since the latter was
merely an incidental beneficiary to the contract."2 He held that ac-
countants have no public duty to perform their work with due care.' 8
Judge Cardozo reasoned that if liability for negligence to third par-
Accountant: An Overview of Common Law Liability to Third Parties, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
431, 450-51 (1984) (authored by Robert E. Pace); Recent Developments, Rosenblum, Inc. v.
Adler.: CPAs Liable at Common Law to Certain Reasonably Foreseeable Third Parties Who
Detrimentally Rely on Negligently Audited Financial Statements, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 335,
359-60 (1985) (authored by William J. Casazza); see also Rusch Factors v. Levin, 284 F.
Supp. 85, 90-91 (D.R.I. 1968); Aluma Kraft Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 383
(Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 101 A.D.2d 231, 237-
38, 476 N.Y.S.2d 539, 543-44 (1984).
7. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
8. Id. at 173-75, 174 N.E. at 442.
9. Id. The defendants, however, had no actual knowledge of the parties from whom
credit would be sought.
10. Id. at 175-76, 174 N.E. at 443.
11. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
12. Id. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
13. Id. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448.
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ties was imposed, the failure to detect theft or forgery beneath the
cover of deceptive entries would expose accountants to liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class. He argued that it was unjust to imply a duty with these poten-
tial consequences.
14
B. Distinguishing Cases Allowing Third Party Recovery in the Ab-
sence of Privity
At the turn of the century, most American courts required priv-
ity to recover damages for either physical or economic injury caused
by the negligent performance of a contract.1" In several landmark
cases, however, the doctrine of privity was abrogated.
In McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.," the same New York Court
of Appeals that decided Ultramares abrogated the privity rule when
a third party was physically injured as a result of the negligence of a
manufacturer. 17 Judge Cardozo held that a duty of reasonable care
was created by the foreseeability of the injury and not by the con-
tract. In Ultramares, however, Cardozo distinguished economic in-
jury caused by reliance on a financial statement from personal injury
suffered as a result of an automotive defect. 8
In Glanzer v. Shepard,'9 the Court of Appeals again allowed a
non-privy party to recover for pecuniary loss in negligence. 0 In that
case, a public weigher contracted with a bean merchant to weigh
beans and send a certified weight ticket to the plaintiff buyers. The
plaintiffs later discovered an error in the weight measurement and
sued the weigher. The court allowed the buyer to recover, reasoning
that the weigher was liable to the buyer for negligent misrepresenta-
tion since the weigher knew that the third party would rely on his
certification. 2' In Ultramares, Judge Cardozo distinguished Glanzer,
maintaining that the third party's reliance in Ultramares was collat-
14. Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444. Some commentators hypothesize that Cardozo may
have felt a need to protect the fledgling accounting industry. Others hypothesize that recovery
may have been denied in negligence because Cardozo was confident that the plaintiff would
prevail on the fraud count. See Note, supra note 6, at 436-37 n. 32; see also Comment, Ad-
justing Accountants' Liability, supra note 5, at 314, 314 n. 77.
15. See Note, supra note 6, at 435, in which many cases are cited illustrating the appli-
cation of the privity doctrine in different contexts.
16. 217 N.Y. 382, III N.E. 1050 (1916).
17. Id. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053.
18. See 255 N.Y. at 181, 174 N.E. at 445. The distinction has been criticized as illogi-
cal. See Recent Developments, supra note 6, at 341 n. 27.
19. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
20. Id. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275-76.
21. Id. Glanzer represented a break with the English position as laid down in Derry v.
Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889) (discussed supra note 4).
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eral and not the "end and aim of the transaction," as in Glanzer.2,
In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 23 Judge Cardozo de-
fined duty in terms of "the risk reasonably to be perceived. '24 Judge
Cardozo stated as follows: "If the harm was not willful, [the plain-
tiff] must show that the act as to him had possibilities of danger so
many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the do-
ing of it though the harm was unintended. 25 Ultramares did not
refer to Palsgraf
III. Impact of Ultramares on Third Party Users of Audited Finan-
cial Statements
The impact of Ultramares was to deny a remedy to a third
party who relied on a financial statement when the third party was
not the primary beneficiary of the contract and there was no fraud.
A. Seeking a Way Out
After Ultramares, creditors and investors who suffered eco-
nomic loss from reliance on negligently prepared financial statements
sought to bring their actions under federal securities laws.2 Rule
lOb-5, which prohibits material misstatements or omissions in con-
nection with the purchase and sale of securities, was relied on most
frequently. 7 Some courts interpreted the rule to prohibit negligent
misrepresentations including negligent preparation of financial state-
ments.28 Since privity was not required, it appeared to provide a way
out of the Ultramares trap for third party users of financial state-
ments. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 9 however, the United States
Supreme Court removed negligence cases from the ambit of rule
lOb-5, holding that actions under the rule required proof of scienter
22. 255 N.Y. 170, 183, 174 N.E. 441, 446 (1931).
23. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
24. Id. at 344, 162 N.E. at 100.
25. Id. at 345, 162 N.E. at 101. While the case does not concern the privity doctrine, it
is important for its definition of duty and foreseeability.
26. The cases arose before the arrival of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977)
formulation which was adopted in several jurisdictions. See infra notes 50-62 and accompany-
ing text.
27. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). It was promulgated under 15 U.S.C. 78j(b)
(1934).
28. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974) rev'd, 425
U.S. 186 (1976).
29. 425 U.S. 186 (1976). This case involved a suit against an accountant for loss occa-
sioned through the negligent preparation of financial statements. The courts left open the ques-
tion as to whether recklessness would suffice to satisfy the scienter requirement. Id. at 193; see
also Brodsky & Swanson, The Expanded Liability of Accountants for Negligence, 12 SEC.
REG. L.J. 252, 252 (1984).
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or intent to defraud.
Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 193330 and Section
18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 may be used as avenues
for suit when a third party suffers pecuniary loss in reliance on negli-
gently prepared financial statements. Sections 11 and 12(1) of the
1933 Act are restricted in their application to cases in which a mis-
statement is made in a registered offering or prospectus. Section
12(2) proscribes the sale of securities through misstatements or
omissions, but it accords a privity defense to the defendant. Section
18 of the 1934 Act imposes liability on accountants for misstate-
ments contained in documents filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. It is, however, limited to documents filed with
the Commission, and it imposes no liability for other documents.
Under Section 18, the accountant may defend on the ground of good
faith.
The utility of these statutory provisions to the ordinary investor
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1982). Section II provides, in part, as follows:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effec-
tive, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a mate-
rial fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved
that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may,
. . . in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue -
(4) every accountant . . . who has with his consent been named as
having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or as
having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in con-
nection with the registration statement . ...
Id. § 77k(a). Section 12 provides, in part, as follows:
Any person who -
(2) offers or sells a security . . . by the use of any means or instru-
ments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of
the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which in-
cludes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements . . . not misleading (the
purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall
be liable to the person purchasing such security from him . ...
Id at § 771.
31. Id. § 78r, which provides, in part, as follows:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any appli-
cation, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regula-
tion thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement ... ,
which statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be
liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading)
who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at
a price which was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such reli-
ance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no
knowledge that such statement was false or misleading.
Id. at § 78r(a).
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or creditor is limited. The typical credit transaction does not involve
securities. Also, Section 13 of the 1933 Act 82 prescribes a one-year
statute of limitations period for bringing actions under sections 11
and 12.
B. Circumventing Ultramares-The Better Alternative
As a result of the limitations of the securities laws and the Su-
preme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst, typical third party credi-
tors and investors were largely without a remedy for economic loss
caused by accountants' negligent misstatements. In that regard, cir-
cumventing the privity doctrine appeared to be the more attractive
alternative. To that end, the citadel of privity constantly has been
assaulted and Ultramares eroded, in the quest to provide third par-
ties with a remedy against negligent accountants.
IV. Erosions of Ultramares
A. Exceptions to Ultramares Fashioned by the New York Court of
Appeals
In White v. Guarente,33 limited partners in a partnership that
had hired accountants to perform an audit brought suit against the
accounting firm. The limited partners alleged that the accountants
were negligent in not informing the plaintiffs that the withdrawal of
certain monies by the general partners constituted a breach of the
partnership agreement."' The lower court dismissed the negligence
claim.
The Court of Appeals did not overrule Ultramares, although it
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the negligence claim. 8 The
court distinguished Ultramares, noting that "the import of UI-
tramares is its holding that an accountant need not respond in negli-
gence to those in the extensive and indeterminable investing public-
at-large."3 6 The court said that "the services of the accountant were
not extended to a faceless or unresolved class of persons, but rather
to a known group possessed of vested rights marked by a definable
limit and made up of certain components." ' The court found that
the accountants must have been aware that the limited partners
32. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982).
33. 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977).
34. Id. at 359-60, 372 N.E.2d at 317-18, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77.
35. Id. at 356, 372 N.E.2d at 320, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
36. Id. at 361, 372 N.E.2d at 318, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
37. Id.
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would rely on the accountants' audit in preparing their own tax re-
turns. Thus, reliance upon the audit was "one of the ends and aims
of the transaction. ' 8
In distinguishing Ultramares, the court appears to have ex-
tended the reasoning of Glanzer (as the court noted) that the third
party's reliance was the end and aim of the transaction. The court
also appears to have fashioned an exception to the primary benefit
rule established in Ultramares.
In Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 9 the plain-
tiffs had extended credit to L.B. Smith, Inc. (Smith) through the
purchase of chattel paper. 40 In reliance on an audit prepared by Ar-
thur Andersen, the plaintiffs extended further credit to Smith.41 The
audit portrayed Smith as financially sound and contained an unqual-
ified opinion that the statements accurately reflected Smith's finan-
cial position. Smith filed for bankruptcy within a few years of receiv-
ing the extended financing. 4 The plaintiffs then sued Arthur
Andersen for the pecuniary loss resulting from their detrimental reli-
ance on the negligently prepared financial statements. 43
The Appellate Division found that the plaintiffs were members
of a limited class of foreseen users that might rely on the financial
statements to its detriment. Thus, the defendants owed the plaintiffs
a duty of care.44 The Appellate Division reaffirmed the Ultramares
principle but relied on the Court of Appeals decision in White, which
recognized a narrow exception to the privity requirement in allowing
a limited class of plaintiffs to recover for their detrimental reliance
on negligently prepared financial statements. 5 Taking note of the
information contained in the financial statement, 4 and considering
the fact that only eight companies could provide the financing de-
sired by Smith, 47 the court found that the defendants reasonably
could have foreseen the plaintiffs' reliance on the financial statement.
It is noteworthy that the court in dictum urged that the privity
38. Id. at 362, 372 N.E.2d at 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 478. The court cited the Glanzer
decision, in which recovery was allowed to a buyer who relied on a weigh certificate on the
ground that the reliance was "the end and aim of the transaction." See Glanzer v. Shepard,
233 N.Y. 236, 238-39, 135 N.E. 275, 275 (1922).
39. 101 A.D.2d 231, 476 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1984).
40. Id. at 232, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
41. Id. at 232-34, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 540-41.
42. Id. Smith owed Credit Alliance and an affiliated organization (Leasing Services) a





47. Id. at 233, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 540-41.
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requirement be abandoned and that accountants be held liable to
reasonably foreseeable users of financial statements, as opposed to
specifically foreseen users.4 8 The court noted further that federal se-
curities laws impose liability on accountants in the absence of priv-
ity, that the accounting profession's own guidelines recognize some
responsibility to the public, and that accountants are seen as public
watchdogs in preparing financial statements."9
B. The Second Restatement of Torts Formulation
The Restatement rejects the privity doctrine and favors ex-
tending liability to third parties specifically foreseen by the account-
ant.50 It modifies Glanzer in that it allows recovery to persons whom
the accountant knew their clients intended to influence as well as
those the accountants intended to influence, as opposed merely to
those the accountants intended to influence.5 1 The Restatement ap-
proach is the most commonly applied alternative to the privity
doctrine.
52
A District Court in Rhode Island relied on a tentative draft of
the Restatement formulation in Rusch Factors Inc. v. Levin5 1 in
which an accountant negligently represented a corporation as finan-
cially solvent. 54 The plaintiff, a lending institution, sustained a loss
as a result of extending a loan on which the corporation defaulted.5 5
The accountant knew that the lender would base its decision on the
financial statement. The court held that the defendant could be lia-
ble to an "actually foreseen and limited class of persons. '56 The
48. Id. at 237-38, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 543-44.
49. Id. With regard to the "Public Watchdog" role of accountants, the court was quot-
ing the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805,
817-18 (1984).
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). This section provides, in perti-
nent part, as follows:
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others
(1) One who, in the course of his ...profession ...supplies false infor-
mation for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to
liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care of competence in obtaining or
communicating the information
(2) [T]he liability stated in subsection (I) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that
the recipient intends to supply it ....
51. See Note, supra note 6, at 439-40.
52. Id.; see also Recent Developments, supra note 6, at 336.
53. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
54. Id. at 86.
55. Id. at 86-87.
56. Id. at 92-93.
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court proposed the adoption of a reasonably foreseeable standard. 57
Recently, the Restatement position was applied in Haddon View
Investment Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand.5 In that case, the plaintiffs,
who were limited partners in two business enterprises, sued the de-
fendants for negligence in auditing the two enterprises. The Supreme
Court of Ohio held for the plaintiffs, finding that they constituted a
limited class of investors whose reliance on the audit for purposes of
investment strategy specifically was foreseen by the defendant. 9
In 1982, a New Hampshire court adopted the Restatement ap-
proach in Spherex Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co.,60 in which a man-
ufacturer suffered credit losses in reliance on audited financial state-
ments. Once again, the accountant knew of the manufacturer's
reliance.61 Other cases have held creditors, investors, and others
(such as an insurance agent relying on an Insurance Commissioner's
assurance of solvency based on an audit) as specifically foreseeable.62
C. A Balancing Test
In Aluma Kraft v. Elmer Fox," the defendant accountants neg-
ligently assessed the book value of stock, knowing that the plaintiffs
would rely on the assessment in purchasing corporate stock. The
court considered certain factors such as the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of
harm, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff was injured, and the
proximity between the defendants' conduct and the plaintiffs' in-
jury.6 ' The relative weight of these factors was not indicated by the
court. 65 This balancing test first was propounded in Biakanja v. Ir-
ving,66 in which a notary public negligently failed to obtain proper
attestation of a will, denying the intended beneficiary her inheri-
57. Id. at 90-92.
58. 70 Ohio St.2d 154, 436 N.E.2d 212 (1982).
59. Id. at 156-57, 436 N.E.2d at 214-15.
60. 122 N.H. 898, 451 A.2d 1308 (1982).
61. Id. at 900, 451 A.2d at 1309. The court relied on Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 345,
404 (Iowa 1969) in holding that an accountant may not escape liability for negligence through
a general disclaimer. See Spherex Inc., 122 N.H. at 905-06, 451 A.2d at 1313.
62. See Merit Ins. Co. v. Colao, 603 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1979); Tiffany Indus. v. Harbor
Ins. Co., 536 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Seedkem Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340 (D.
Neb. 1979); Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 248 N.W.2d 291 (1976) (insurance agent
relying on an Insurance Commissioner's assurance of solvency based on an audit); Spherex
Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 451 A.2d 1308 (1982); Shatterproof Glass
Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
63. 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
64. Id. at 383.
65. See Note, supra note 6, at 443 n. 71.
66. 49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
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tance. The court in Aluma Kraft concluded as follows:
[The plaintiffs'] allegations are sufficient to show that Fox
knew its opinion would be utilized by the plaintiff, knew a
purchase of stock was contemplated, knew the purchase price
was to be computed based upon the audit, and knew the audit
would be furnished to the purchasers, Solmica. Therefore, these
allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief.67
In Raritan River Steel & Co. v. Cherry & Beckaert,68 the Inter-
national Metals Corporation (I.M.C.) hired the defendant account-
ant to audit its financial statements for the fiscal years 1980 and
1981. The plaintiffs had sold raw steel to I.M.C. on credit on several
occasions. The defendants overstated the net worth of I.M.C. in a
grossly erroneous manner. Dunn and Bradstreet published a report
on I.M.C. that referred to the audit. Relying on the Dunn and Brad-
street report, the plaintiffs extended over eighty-two million dollars
of credit to I.M.C.69 I.M.C. subsequently went bankrupt. The plain-
tiffs sued the accountants, inter alia, for negligent misrepresentation.
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that because
Raritan was an intended third party beneficiary of the contract be-
tween I.M.C. and the defendants, the law implies privity of contract.
As such, Raritan could sue in tort for injury resulting from the negli-
gent performance of the contract.7 0 As to the consolidated Sidbec
claim, the court found that Sidbec was not a third party beneficiary.
As a result, no privity could be implied. The court thus considered
whether in the absence of privity, Sidbec could maintain an action
against the defendants for a negligently prepared audit.
71
The court held that lack of privity was no bar to a suit against
accountants for negligent misrepresentation. 72 As to the standard to
67. Aluma Kraft, 493 S.W.2d at 383. The court added the following concerning the
privity doctrine:
Our rejection of the requirement of the strict rule of privity in this case
comports with the concepts of the functions and duties of the modern public
accountant, the purposes of a modern audit, is consistent with the developments
of the liability of an accountant under the securities laws and is consistent with
the recent developments in England where the doctrine of privity was born.
Id. at 383-84 (citations omitted).
68. 79 N.C. App. 81, 339 S.E.2d 62 (1986). Raritan sued for negligent misrepresenta-
tion and on third party beneficiary contract doctrine. The court found that Raritan had stated
a claim on both theories. The case was consolidated with a different claim by Sidbec arising
out of the same facts. Sidbec was found to have stated a claim only in negligent misrepresenta-
tion. Id. at -, 339 S.E.2d at 64.
69. Id. at __, 339 S.E.2d at 65.
70. Id. at __, 339 S.E.2d at 66.
71. Id.
72. North Carolina already subjected engineers to the Restatement formulation, and
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use in determining liability, the court refused to follow the reasona-
bly foreseeable test, citing the magnitude of losses that could result
from widespread circulation of misinformation. It also refused to use
the Restatement formulation in view of its arbitrary limit on the
class of potential plaintiffs. 7" The court maintained that the balanc-
ing test, which focuses, among other factors, on the purpose of the
audit, avoids these problems.
The factors considered by the court were the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff;74 whether it was
foreseeable that failure to discover and disclose that I.M.C. had a
substantial negative net worth would harm creditors who extended
credit relying on the defendant's audit; whether the plaintiff had suf-
fered injury; and whether the defendant's negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff's injury.75 Based on these factors, the court
found that Sidbec had stated a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation.
D. The Reasonably Foreseeable Approach
Several recent decisions have held that a reasonably foreseeable
user of financial statements may recover in negligence against an ac-
countant notwithstanding lack of privity.
76
In H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler7 Touche Ross & Co. con-
ducted an annual audit of Giant Stores Corporation's financial state-
ments for the 1971 and 1972 fiscal years.7 8 Neither Touche Ross nor
Giant Stores was aware of the existence of the plaintiffs at the time
of the audit. Later in 1971, Giant Stores began negotiating with the
plaintiffs to buy the plaintiff's business.70 Plaintiffs agreed to sell
their business to Giant Stores in return for Giant common stock,
relying on the unqualified opinion of Touche Ross accompanying Gi-
ant Stores' financial statements. The financial statements turned out
to be materially misstated, and Giant Stores went bankrupt. The
attorneys and architects to the balancing test. Id. at -, 339 S.E.2d at 67-68.
73. Id. at -. , 339 S.E.2d at 68.
74. Note that Sidbec was not specifically foreseen. The court nonetheless found that the
transaction arguably was intended to affect Sidbec.
75. The test uses notions of foreseeability, injury, and proximate cause. It would appear,
in effect, to be a traditional negligence standard couched in different terms.
76. See International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal.
App.3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d
138 (1983); Citizens State Bank v. Timm Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis.2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361
(1983).
77. 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
78. Id. at 330, 461 A.2d at 141.
79. Id. at 329-30, 461 A.2d at 140-41.
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plaintiffs sued Touche Ross and its individual partners in negligence.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, relying on Palsgraf s definition
of duty, held that an independent auditor who issues an opinion on
financial statements and does not limit their dissemination owes a
legal duty to all reasonably foreseeable third parties who rely on the
statements. The statements, however, must be received from the
company for a proper business purpose.8"
In Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co.,8" a bank
loaned money to a borrower on the strength of financial statements
prepared by the defendant accounting firm. The borrower went
bankrupt after it was discovered that the financial statements con-
tained several errors. 82 The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to fol-
low the Restatement formulation, finding it too restrictive,83 and
adopted a reasonably foreseeable standard.8 ' The court reasoned that
broader liability would better protect third parties and control the
rising cost of credit to the public. The court held that accountants
are liable for all reasonably foreseeable injuries resulting from negli-
gence unless there are strong public policy reasons that dictate
otherwise.
85
In International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy
Corp.,86 John P. Butler issued an unqualified financial statement fol-
lowing an audit of Westside Mortgage, Inc. (Westside). Interna-
tional Mortgage Co. (International), in reliance on the financial
statement, entered into a business arrangement with Westside to buy
and sell real estate loans on the secondary market. The financial
80. Id. at 352, 461 A.2d at 153. The court reversed the dismissal of the negligence claim
for the 1971 audit and affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss a negligence and fraud claim
for the 1972 audit. The limitations imposed by the court in applying this standard will be
discussed later when evaluating the soundness of this approach from a policy viewpoint. See
infra notes 113-118 and accompanying text. It is noteworthy that New Jersey had hitherto
followed the Restatement formulation in determining accountants' liability for negligence.
81. 113 Wis.2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983), decided within a month of Rosenblum.
82. Id. at 378-79, 335 N.W.2d at 362.
83. Id. at 384, 335 N.W.2d at 365.
84. Id. at 386, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
85. Id. The court listed the following public policy reasons for not imposing liability:
(1) The injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too
wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor; or (3) in
retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have
brought about the harm; or (4) because allowance of recovery would place too
unreasonable a burden on the negligent tort-feasor; or (5) because allowance of
recovery would be too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) allow-
ance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
Id. at 387, 335 N.W.2d at 336 (citations omitted). The court remanded the case for a full
factual determination prior to an evaluation of the public policy considerations involved. Id.
86. 177 Cal. App.3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986). The California Supreme Court
declined to review this decision.
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statements were materially false, however, as over fifty-seven percent
of Westside's assets consisted of a worthless note. International lost
over 435,000 dollars doing business with Westside and subsequently
sued Westside and the accountants.
The California Appellate Court noted the erosion of the privity
doctrine in other areas, such as liability of attorneys, notary publics,
and public weighers. 87 The court rejected the argument that ac-
countants should be treated differently from other professionals be-
cause they did not control their clients' use of reports, noting that
the independent auditor is charged with public trust, since his or her
product will be relied upon by creditors, stockholders, and inves-
tors.89 The court noted that in issuing an opinion, an accountant is
not guaranteeing that the client's financial statements are perfect,
but only that any errors that might exist could not be detected by an
audit conducted under the Generally Accepted Accounting Princi-
ples and the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards promulgated
by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.89 The
court subjected accountants to a reasonable foreseeability standard,
the same standard applied to other professions. 90
The court stated that the privity rule was no longer viable in
view of changes in the role of the accountant in modern society. The
court rejected the privity doctrine and the Restatement position as
not meeting California's concept of tort liability for negligence, stat-
ing that in the absence of public policy reasons, an exception should
not be created for accountants in the area of negligence liability. 91
The court stated that
[a]n innocent plaintiff who foreseeably relies on an indepen-
dent auditor's unqualified financial statement should not be
made to bear the burden of the professional's malpractice. The
risk of such loss is more appropriately placed on the accounting
profession which is better able to pass such risk to its customers
and the ultimate consuming public. By doing so, society is better
served; for such a rule provides a financial disincentive for negli-
gent conduct and will heighten the profession's cautionary
techniques.92
87. Id. at 812-15, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 221-23.
88. Id. at 816-17, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
89. Id. at 817-18, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 225. See infra note 97.
90. Id. at 818-19, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26. The court noted the Rosenblum and Citi-
zens State Bank decisions. Id. at 818-19, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
91. Id. at 819-20, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27.
92. Id. at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
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The court held that independent auditors are liable to reasonably
foreseeable plaintiffs who rely on negligently prepared financial
statements.
9 3
V. Which Approach is Most Sound from a Public Policy
Viewpoint?
A. The Privity Approach
In Ultramares, Judge Cardozo held accountants to have no pub-
lic duty to perform their work with due care. This could have re-
sulted from a concern to protect a fledgling industry. Others hypoth-
esize that he may have felt no need to impose negligence liability
since a fraud cause of action had been stated. 94 Judge Cardozo also
was concerned about imposing liability in an indeterminate amount
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class, although he had
imposed such liability on manufacturers in MacPherson for personal
injury and used a reasonable foreseeability test in defining duty in
Palsgraf.9
The accounting industry is certainly no longer a fledgling indus-
try. It is a full-fledged, well-established, and successful profession on
whose professional judgment creditors, investors, and others rely in
making important financial decisions. The financial consequences of
imposing a negligence standard are not as potentially crippling as
they might have been at the time of Ultramares. Of course, account-
ants today can insure against professional liability.91
There is no incentive for accountants to use reasonable care in
performing audits if they can cause millions of dollars of losses to
third parties without liability. The privity doctrine is inconsistent
with traditional tort principles, whose concern is to shift losses from
injured persons to tort-feasors. The accounting industry itself recog-
nizes a duty to the public.97 Also, as seen in United States v. Arthur
93. Id. The court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment remanding the
case to the trial court to consider whether Butler had breached its duty of care. Id. at 820-21,
223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
94. See supra note 14. The fraud count was never tried on remand because the case was
settled. I J. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 257 (1969).
95. See supra notes 16, 23 and accompanying text.
96. Although there is a liability insurance capacity crunch, this affects the medical, le-
gal, and other professions, as well as municipalities, manufacturers, and a wide range of other
insurance consumers. Thus, the capacity crunch does not justify a different standard for
accountants.
97. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants recognizes in its code of
professional ethics that accountants owe a duty to the public. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS: CONCEPTS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, ET, § 51.04 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Ac-
countants 1977). The Institute has set Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) and
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Young & Co.,98 accountants are seen as public watchdogs.
The privity doctrine is, to say the least, an indefensible anachro-
nism and must be abandoned. The question remains as to the most
sound alternative from a policy viewpoint.
B. The Restatement Approach
The Restatement allows a restricted group of third parties to
recover for pecuniary loss resulting from reliance on negligently pre-
pared financial statements. These are third parties that the account-
ants intend to influence and those that the accountants know their
clients intend to influence. Thus, the accountants must be aware of
the existence of these parties and of their potential reliance.
The problem with the Restatement approach is that it would
deny recovery to the typical investor who was unknown to the ac-
countants or their clients at the time of the audit. The Restatement
rationalizes that the scope of liability is limited because of the extent
to which erroneous information may be propagated and the magni-
tude of the losses that may ensue from reliance." This begs the
question, however, why an accountant, aware of how important his
or her role is in the economy, should be immune from the conse-
quences of his or her negligence on account of their gravity. It is
precisely for this reason that accountants must be made to improve
their standards. They must be deterred from causing financial disas-
ters with impunity.
The Restatement also rationalizes that accountants must not
owe a duty to third parties when the accountants are not aware of
the terms of the third party obligation. 100 As already seen, this argu-
ment did not stop courts from holding manufacturers liable to third
party users of their products. Any purported distinction between
purely pecuniary loss and physical or property damage is illogical. 10'
The Restatement lastly argues that its formulation would encourage
the flow of commercial information upon which the economy rests.
102
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for accountants. See 2 A.I.C.P.A. PROFES-
SIONAL STANDARDS, ET § 202.01 (Am. Inst. Of Certified Pub. Accountants 1981). GAAP are
rules and procedure of financial reporting defined by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board.
98. 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1977).
100. Id.
101. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, II1 N.E. 1050 (1916); see
also Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (Judge Cardozo
defined duty in terms of the risk reasonably to be perceived); supra note 19.
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1977).
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It is unlikely that extending accountants' liability beyond specifically
foreseen third parties would end or restrict the free flow of financial
information in the economy. Investors and others who make impor-
tant business decisions will always be more careful. Furthermore,
while accountants might try to control the extent of propagation of
information for the purpose of restricting their liability, they will not
do so for the purpose of literally preventing access to such
information.
C. The Balancing Test Approach
This test was used in Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co.103 and Raritan
River Steel.10 4 The idea is to balance certain factors in considering
whether to impose liability in the absence of privity. The factors are
the extent to which the transaction is intended to affect the plaintiff;
whether it was foreseeable that failure to discover and disclose errors
would harm creditors who extend credit in reliance on an audit;
whether the plaintiff has suffered injury; and whether negligence was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.1 0 5 The Raritan River
Steel court refused to follow the Restatement approach because of
its restrictiveness and refused to follow the reasonably foreseeable
approach because of the magnitude of losses that could result from
its use.106
The balancing test, however, appears, in effect, to be an applica-
tion of the reasonably foreseeable standard. The test speaks in terms
of an intent to influence the plaintiff, foreseeability of harm, injury,
and proximate cause. In Raritan River Steel, Sidbec, the plaintiff in
the suit consolidated with the Raritan suit, was not specifically fore-
seen by the defendants. The court had found that Sidbec was not a
third party beneficiary (unlike Raritan) of the contract between the
accountants and their clients. Nonetheless, the court found that the
transaction arguably was intended to influence Sidbec. 0 7 It is diffi-
cult to explain how one not intended to be benefited by a contract
103. 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
104. 79 N.C. App. 81, 339 S.E.2d 62 (1986).
105. See, e.g., id. at - , 339 S.E.2d at 66.
106. Id. at -, 339 S.E.2d at 68-69.
107. Id. at -, 339 S.E.2d at 66. The question before the court was whether Sidbec's
complaint stated a cause of action. Sidbec's complaint alleged that the defendant's contract
with IMC was entered into "for the direct benefit of the [p]laintiff and other creditors who the
[d]efendant[s] knew would be relying upon such information." The court held that this allega-
tion arguably showed that the defendant's audit was "directly intended to affect plaintiff," and
that it was thus not possible to conclude "to a certainty that plaintiff/s] [are] entitled to no
relief under any state of facts." Nevertheless, the court noted that Sidbec would have the
burden of proving its allegations at the evidentiary stage. Id. at - , 339 S.E.2d at 69.
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and not specifically foreseen by the parties was intended to be influ-
enced by it.
The balancing test would appear to be unclear and capable of
manipulation by a court. Why not simply adopt a reasonably fore-
seeable test instead of one capable of manipulation to achieve the
same effect?
D. The Reasonably Foreseeable Approach
Rosenblum'08 was the first case to adopt a test based upon rea-
sonable foreseeability. The court based its decision on public policy
reasons. First, the court stated that, "If CPAs were to engage in
more thorough reviews, they could reduce the number of instances of
negligence."'109 In other words, accountants are in a better position
than the third party to avoid the costs of a negligent audit. Second,
the court considered that CPAs can obtain malpractice insurance to
protect themselves from the costs of liability and can pass on the
insurance premiums and the cost of more extensive audits to their
clients and, ultimately, to their clients' customers or stockholders. 1
Thus, CPAs would not be subjected to financial disaster on the adop-
tion of a reasonable foreseeability standard.' Last, the court stated
that it was only fair for negligent accountants to be liable for dam-
ages to third parties who detrimentally rely on their audits." 2
The court in Rosenblum formulated some limitations on ac-
countants' potential liability."3 First, the third party must receive
the financial statement from the company pursuant to a proper com-
pany purpose."' Second, the plaintiff must reasonably rely on the
financial statements." 5 Third, the misstatement in the financial
statement must result from the auditor's negligence and must be the
108. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
109. id. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 349, 461 A.2d at 151. The court noted that accountants have purchased
liability insurance to protect themselves under federal securities laws. Id.
112. Id. at 351, 461 A.2d at 153. The court stated that "whether a duty exists is ulti-
mately a question of fairness." Id. at 341, 461 A.2d at 147.
113. Id. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152.
114. Id. In Raritan River Steel, 79 N.C. App. 81, 339 S.E.2d 62 (1986), the plaintiff
had relied on a Dunn and Bradstreet report referring to the audit. Thus, the plaintiff in that
case would not recover under the Rosenblum formulation, since the financial statements were
not obtained from the company. Although the court refused to adopt a reasonably foreseeable
test on account of its expansiveness, Sidbec was able to recover under the balancing test.
Sidbec did not specifically allege that it had relied on the Dunn and Bradstreet report. It
simply stated that it had suffered damages in reliance on the accountants' audit. Id. at -'
339 S.E.2d at 65.
115. Id. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152.
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proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff.116 Fourth, the plaintiff's
own negligence could bar or limit recovery. 1 7 Last, when the ac-
countant's client contributes to the misstatement and the resulting
loss, the accountant may seek indemnification or contribution from
the client company. 118
Thus, the reasonable foreseeability test will not impose liability
to an indeterminate class in an indeterminate amount so as to be
financially disastrous. The built-in limitations enumerated above
only allow recovery to certain reasonably foreseeable users of finan-
cial statements. Accountants, like other professionals, can protect
themselves through liability insurance." 9 The reasonable foreseeabil-
ity approach brings the law on accountants' liability to third parties
in accordance with traditional tort principles of compensation. More-
over, it will ensure higher standards on the part of accountants and
more equitable treatment of injured third parties.
VI. Conclusion
The law on accountants' liability for negligence to third parties
has undergone significant changes since Ultramares, although most
states still apply some aspect of the privity doctrine. In view of the
unsatisfactoriness of the privity rule in today's society, the assault on
the citadel of privity has begun and will continue. At present, the
majority of courts rejecting the privity doctrine follow the Restate-
ment formulation of third parties who may recover.
The balancing test, which has been used in at least two jurisdic-
tions, is unclear as to the relative weight to be attached to its compo-
nent factors and is susceptible of manipulation. In effect, it appears
to be an indirect application of the reasonable foreseeability stan-
dard. This reasonable foreseeability standard is the most sound of
the options from a public policy viewpoint. It does not arbitrarily
limit the class of compensable plaintiffs, but, at the same time, it
limits the potential liability of accountants to users of financial
statements.
New Jersey, Wisconsin, and California have adopted the rea-
sonable foreseeability test. Thus, the erosion of the privity doctrine
continues. Its death knell has not yet sounded, however, since most
courts still retain some aspect of the privity doctrine. It remains to
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 351, 461 A.2d at 152.
119. The present liability insurance capacity crunch is no justification to treat account-
ants differently. See supra note 96.
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be seen whether the reasonable foreseeability standard will sweep
through those jurisdictions that have not yet adopted it.

